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A Call for Minds: The Unknown Extent of Societal
Influence on the Legal Rights of Involuntarily and
Voluntarily Committed Mental Health Patients
Teresa Cannistraro*
I. INTRODUCTION
Regrettably, our society stigmatizes mental illness' and the law is a
profoundly social institution. Thus, the societal bias against mental illness
likely infiltrates the minds and decision-making of lawyers, mental health
experts, judges, and juries.2 In other words, justice may not be so blind
when weighing the case of a mentally ill person.
As of yet, no one seems to understand the extent to which the social
stigma against the mentally ill influences decisions of players in the legal
system. In order to understand and make improvements, more empirical
research must be done to understand the connection between societal views
of mental illness and the legal system. Undoubtedly, societal views and the
legal system play off of each other with some measure of feedback, but the
amplitude remains uncertain.
This article focuses on one small area of mental health law to
demonstrate the need for further research into the behavioral response of
legal players to the changing social perceptions of mental illness.
Specifically, this article discusses the circumstances under which a
voluntarily committed mental health patient deserves the same protections
from the State as an involuntarily committed patient pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.3 Currently, the federal circuit
* Juris Doctor expected May 2010, University of Illinois College of Law; B.A., University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; M.A., University of Chicago Master of Arts Program in the
Social Sciences.
1. In response to the common occurrence of discrimination against the mentally ill, the
federal government provides resources to the public. See, e.g., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL
HEALTH SERVICES ADMN.'s NAT'L MENTAL HEALTH INFO. NETWORK, RIGHTS AND
PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY (2003), http://mentalhealth.samhsa.gov/publications/allpubs/
P&A/default.asp.
2. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 24-25
(2000).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
1
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courts disagree about whether all mentally ill patients committed to
4institutions deserve the same constitutional protections. Part II provides a
condensed background about commitment to mental institutions and
societal reaction. Part III describes the disagreement among the federal
circuits and explains that the inconsistencies rest in large part upon
malleability of factors and the influence of popular sentiment on the legal
process. Part IV asserts the need for empirical evidence in order to uncover
the connection between popular views of mental illness and the abrogation
of rights endowed to the mentally ill.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand what protections the State may owe to individuals
committed to mental institutions, some background about commitment must
be imparted. For instance, one must appreciate the role mental institutions
play in society and how people are institutionalized. Certainly as social
values change over time, the role that mental institutions play in society
changes to fit those new conceptions.
A. The Basics of Commitment
During any given year, about twenty percent of the adult American
population experiences mental illness.' Mental institutions serve an
important social purpose when operated as intended. When out-patient
treatments are insufficient to temper episodes of serious mental illness,
mental institutions both treat a person's mental illness and ensure the safety
of that person and society at large.6 These two goals match up with two
related powers of the State: parens patriae and police powers.7 Parens
patriae is the State's power to protect individuals while the State's police
power allows the State to enforce civility by restraining individuals
disrupting the peace.8
There are two ways to enter a mental institution: voluntarily or
involuntarily. On the surface, there appears to be a clear dichotomy-either
a person enters an institution according to his or her will or against it-but
the distinction is not always so clear.9 Voluntariness of commitment exists
4. See infra Part II.
5. U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, The Fundamentals of Mental Health and
Mental illness, in MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1999) available
at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/home.htm (last visited Mar. 16,
2009).
6. See RALPH REISNER ET. AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL ASPECTS 676-78 (4th ed. 2004).
7. See generally id.
8. Id.
9. However, one commentator identifies eight types of commitment to mental health
[Vol. 19
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as a continuum with involuntary at one pole and voluntary at the other.
Signing an informed consent waiver does not necessarily mean that a
person freely decided to admit himself for treatment.' Third party
commitment by a legal guardian, which commonly occurs for minors,
further complicates the differentiation between involuntary and voluntary
commitment.1 Additionally, the degree of voluntariness may change as
circumstances evolve over time. Even those individuals who arguably
choose to enter a hospital or mental institution are often coerced to stay
longer than they wish or to undergo treatment procedures without consent,
thus creating situations of involuntary commitment.13 As well, a voluntarily
admitted patient who wishes to leave earlier than the facility administrators
think prudent may be held temporarily in anticipation of involuntary
commitment. 14 Therefore, a person may start out voluntarily committed,
become involuntarily committed, or be in a situation that equates to
involuntary commitment. 
15
B. Involuntary Commitment Procedure
State law governs civil commitment proceedings and each state defines
the law in its own way. Illinois law defines mental illness as "a mental or
emotional disorder that substantially impairs a person's thoughts,
institutions: informal commitment (the only truly voluntary type), voluntary commitment,
third party commitment, short-term-commitment, extended commitment, outpatient
commitment, criminal commitment, and recommitment. John Parry, Involuntary Civil
Commitment in the 90s: A Constitutional Perspective, 18 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY
L. REP. 320, 321-22 (1994).
10. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 136 (1990) ("It is hardly unforeseeable that a
person requesting treatment for mental illness might be incapable of informed consent, and
that state officials with the power to admit patients might take their apparent willingness to
be admitted at face value and not initiate involuntary placement procedures.").
11. See, e.g., 2 N.J. PRAC., COURT RuLES ANNOTATED R 4:74-7A (2009) (allowing a
parent to consent to the admission of a minor as long as an independent medical authority
agrees; but if the minor disagrees then the court will appoint a guardian ad litem for civil
commitment proceedings).
12. Cf Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., 961 F.2d 987, 992 (1st Cir. 1992)
(differentiating an involuntary state bar against leaving a facility from a person's inability to
leave because of an impairing mental condition).
13. See 1 Michael L. Perlin, Mental Disability Law § 2C-7.2 at 482-83 (2d ed. 1998).
14. See Sarah C. Kellogg, Note, The Due Process Right to a Safe and Humane
Environment for Patients in State Custody: The Voluntary/Involuntary Distinction, 23 AM
J.L. & MED. 339, 342 (1997). See also 50 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7206(a) (West 2002).
15. See United States v. Pennsylvania, 832 F. Supp. 122, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(explaining how a voluntary commitment may become involuntary through state action to
restrain liberty through the use of restraints on a patient). The lack of autonomy affiliated
with situational involuntary commitment is analogous to nursing home residents who may,
with their physician's permission, be physically or chemically restrained "to ensure the
physical safety of the resident or other residents." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r(c)(1)(A)(ii) (West
2006).
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perception of reality, emotional process, judgment, behavior, or ability to
cope with the ordinary demands of life."16 The definition of mental illness,
however, excludes "developmental disability, dementia or Alzheimer's
disease absent psychosis, a substance abuse disorder, or an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct."
' 17
The process of involuntary civil commitment for mental illness usually
begins with a petition to the state court filed by a family member or mental
health professional. Often, the defendant in the case already resides in a
treatment facility for temporary observation or for a prior episode of
involuntary commitment.18 After the proper notice is given to the defendant,
the court conducts a hearing. 19
As articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1970s and continuing to
this day, the states have the power to commit a mentally ill individual on
the basis of "dangerousness to self, dangerousness to others, and the need
for care of treatment and training." 20 However, no steadfast definition of
dangerousness exists to guide the courts. 21 Usually, the courts find the need
for civil commitment if an "imminent danger" exists.22 Naturally, courts
rely upon mental health experts for predictions about when dangerousness
might erupt in a person.23 At least one mental health professional testifies at
16. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-129 (LexisNexis 2009).
17. Id.
18. See 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-704(a) (LexisNexis 2009).
19. See, e.g., 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-706.
20. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 727-30 (1972) (applying due process principles to
civil commitment); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573-76 (1975) (prohibiting state
confinement for mental illness without a component of dangerousness).
21. For some perspective, an Illinois court may impose involuntary admission to a
treatment institution if the defendant is a "[p]erson subject to involuntary admission," which
refers to:
(1) A person with mental illness and who because of his or her illness is
reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another in
the near future which may be threatening behavior or conduct that places another
individual in reasonable expectation of being of being harmed; or
(2) A person with mental illness and who because of his or her illness is unable to
provide for his basic physical needs so as to guard himself or herself from serious
harm without the assistance of family or outside help.
(3) A person with mental illness who, because of the nature of his or her illness,
is unable to understand his or her need for treatment and who, if not treated, is
reasonably expected to suffer or continue to suffer from mental deterioration or
emotional deterioration, or both, to the point that the person is reasonably
expected to engage in dangerous conduct.
405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-119 (LexisNexis 2009). In reaching a decision,
"the court may consider evidence of the person's repeated past pattern of specific
behavior and actions related to the person's illness." Id.
22. See Richard I. Simon, The Myth of "Imminent" Violence in Psychiatry and the Law,
75 U. CiN. L. REv. 631, 635 (2006).
23. Id. at 635-36.
[Vol. 19
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the hearing to share his or her expert opinion.24 The expert testifies, based
on a professional evaluation of the respondent's past actions and
expressions, that the defendant should be placed in a mental institution as a
result of acute mental illness. Yet even the experts know that predicting
behavior is far from an exact science. 6 Regardless of this doubt, the
testimony provided by medical experts usually demonstrates a "clear and
convincing" need for commitment that is sufficient for a judge to impose
27involuntary treatment.
Unlike criminal proceedings, in which the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause applies, the defendant in a civil commitment
proceeding lacks the right to face his accusers.28 This makes sense because,
in the balance of interests, the individual's interest in an adversarial hearing
does not outweigh the State's financial burden of administration. 9 In
reality, civil commitment hearings have almost entirely lost their
adversarial quality.3° Indeed, some scholars argue that mediation should
replace courtroom hearings in order to promote the therapeutic goals of the
patient and the protective nature of commitment.3
After ruling in favor of civil commitment, the court must fashion the
parameters of the commitment based on the alternative treatments
available.32 Typically, "state statutes require the committing authority to
consider dispositions other than hospitalization in a mental institution., 33
The requirement became known as the least restrictive alternative test
24. See, e.g., 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-807 (LexisNexis 2009) ("No respondent
may be found subject to involuntary admission unless at least one psychiatrist, clinical social
worker, or clinical psychologist who has examined him testifies in person at the hearing. The
respondent may waive the requirement of the testimony subject to the approval of the
court.").
25. Id.
26. Simon, supra note 22, at 640 (drawing an analogy between psychiatry and weather
forecasting).
27. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,431-33 (1979).
28. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982).
29. Id.
30. Joseph Frueh, Note, The Anders Brief in Appeals from Civil Commitment, 118 YALE
L.J. 272, 300-15 (2008) (suggesting stricter standards of accountability in order to combat
laziness by civil commitment defense attorneys).
31. See John Ensminger & Thomas Liguori, The Therapeutic Significance of the Civil
Commitment Hearing: An Unexplored Potential, 6 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 21 (1978); Joel
Haycock, David Finkelman, & Helene Presskreischer, Mediating the Gap: Thinking About
Alternatives to the Current Practice of Civil Commitment, 20 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 265, 279-82 (1994); Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the
Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 52-53 (1999).
32. See, e.g., 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-810 (LexisNexis 2009).
33. RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL ASPECTS 746 (4th ed. 2004).
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(LRA) and is thought to infringe the least upon due process rights.34 Despite
the alternatives to institutional commitment, many states have loosened
their laws regarding civil commitment in order to make inpatient, rather
than outpatient, treatment more common.35
A great deal has been said about how far the State should go with its
power to commit mentally ill individuals to institutions. However, little
attention has been paid to the duty that the State owes to individuals
committed to mental institutions.
C. Conflicting Perceptions of Mental Illness
Rare and sensational events such as the Virginia Tech Massacre 36 or the
shooting on the campus of Northern Illinois University 37 can overshadow
the true nature of mental illness in the United States.38 These events feed
into the stereotype that the mentally ill are dangerous.39 Society's negative
misconceptions ostracize the mentally ill as inferior "others" undeserving of
empathy.40 Left unchecked, the negative stereotypes turn into a self-
41prophesying stereotype.
No matter how uncommon the occurrence, "publicly salient events such
as a heinous murder of an innocent victim at the hands of a discharged
mental health patient... may have the effect of increasing the rate of
commitments. 4 2 Indeed, the law in Virginia loosened its criteria for civil
34. See id. But see Alison Pfeffer, "Imminent Danger" and Inconsistency: The Need for
National Reform of the "Imminent Danger" Standard for Involuntary Civil Commitment in
the Wake of the Virginia Tech Tragedy, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 277, 301-03 (2008) (opposing
the least restrictive alternative test because it would allow dangerous, mentally ill people,
like Seung-Hui Cho, to live in society).
35. See TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., STATE STANDARDS FOR ASSISTED TREATMENT:
STATE BY STATE CHART 2-8 (2008), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/tac/
documents/new the updatedstate-standardschart.pdf (charting each state's civil
commitment statutes for mental illness).
36. As a testament to the poignancy of the event, a Westlaw search of ["Virginia Tech"
and "Seung-Hui Cho"] within "All News" under the news database before February 14, 2009
resulted in 5773 hits.
37. Shortly following such occurrences, the media usually presents mortifying stories
from survivors and heart-wrenching descriptions of the innocent people harmed. See, e.g.,
Susan Saulny & Jeff Bailey, Grief and Questions after Deadly Shootings, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
16, 2008, at A13 (detailing witness reactions to the shooting at Northern Illinois University
by a University of Illinois-Urbana graduate student).
38. U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVs., Introduction and Themes, in MENTAL
HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 3, 8 (1999) available at
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/home.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2009).
39. Id. at 7 (comparing surveys from 1950 and 1996 that show an increased ability to
recognize mental illness but also an increased stigma of violence attached to mental illness).
40. See PERLIN, supra note 2, at 21-23.
41. Id. at8.
42. R. Michael Bagby & Leslie Atkinson, The Effects of Legislative Reform on Civil
Commitment Admission Rates: A CriticalAnalysis, 6 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 45, 46 (1988).
430 [Vol. 19
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commitment after the Virginia Tech Massacre. 43 While the courts are
considered more tempered in their reaction than the legislature, the legal
system is made of human beings who are subject to social pressures just
like anybody else. Lawyers, mental health experts, and even judges are not
immune to the influence of popular sentiment.44 Anecdotally, commitments
in Washington increased by nearly 100% after an individual denied
admission to a state hospital perpetrated a double homicide.45
Dealing with mental illness is unlike most conflicts solved through the
justice system because civil commitment procedures are not intended to
assign moral blame and punishment but to determine need for mental
treatment and rehabilitation. However, civil commitment does force
individuals to lengthy confinement.
D. Rights of the Involuntarily Committed Defined by
Youngberg and DeShaney
Upon admission to a state mental health institution, the State owes a
minimal duty of care to an involuntarily committed person.46 If an agent of
the State breaches the duty of care owed to the institutionalized patient, then
the individual may be entitled to a legal or equitable remedy under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. 47 Section 1983 is a federal law that allows a person to bring
a civil action for a deprivation of his rights, including the Fourteenth
48Amendment right to substantive due process. State health facilities are
subject to Section 1983 because they are state actors.49
After the civil rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s, the 1980s and
1990s showcased "a general 'chilling' of America resulting in less interest
in protecting or assisting the troubled or disadvantaged." 50 The cases of
43. Following the Virginia Tech massacre in 2007, Governor Timothy M. Kaine signed
a new state law to "relax the standard for involuntary commitment to a mental health
facility" plus "extend the time a person can be detained for observation." Associated Press,
Virginia: Campus Security Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2008, at A23.
44. See PERLIN, supra note 2, at 21-22.
45. William H. Fisher et al., How Flexible Are Our Civil Commitment Statutes?, 39
HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 711, 712 (1988).
46. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (providing a cause of action for the "deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws").
48. See id.
49. See id. (Section 1983 applies to "(e)very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State..." deprives an individual of any rights
under the Constitution).
50. Thomas L. Hafemeister and John Petrila, Treating the Mentally Disordered
Offender: Society's Uncertain, Conflicted, and Changing Views, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 731,
742-43 (1994) (contributing the "chilling," in part, to a deluge of newly appointed
conservative federal judges).
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Youngberg v. Romeo 51 and DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services52 reflect decisions from that colder era. After slightly
opening the door in Youngberg,53 the Supreme Court reigned in expansion
of affirmative state protections to individuals in DeShaney.
54
1. The Youngberg Substantive Due Process Protections
In Youngberg, the Supreme Court considered "for the first time the
substantive rights of involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution., 55 The Court found
that involuntary commitment, though producing confinement, did not
extinguish all of a person's liberties.56 In addition to a State's duty to
provide "adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care,, 57 involuntarily
committed mental health patients are entitled to "safe conditions" and
"freedom from bodily restraint" 58 and the protection of such rights through
some minimal level of training provided to the individual by the State.59
Although the involuntarily committed are entitled to safe conditions and
freedom of restraint, those rights are not boundless and may very well
become inhibited by the nature of the institution and the desire to keep
individuals safe from themselves and one another. 60 Because those
committed sometimes pose a threat to themselves and others in the
institution, "[tihe question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has
been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the restraint or lack of
absolute safety is such as to violate due process., 61 Hence, the court must
51. See generally Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
52. See generally DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989).
53. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324 (holding that under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, the State has a duty to provide institutionalized individuals with
reasonable care and safety, reasonable nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and adequate
training to ensure such care and safety and conditions).
54. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201-02 (holding that the State has no duty under the
Fourteenth Amendment to protect a child from harm inflicted by a parent while in the
parent's custody, even though the state may have had knowledge of the potential danger to
the child).
55. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 314.
56. Id. at 315.
57. Id. at 324. By setting out the state's affirmative duties, some have used Youngberg to
promote an argument for furthering educational initiatives. See, e.g., Note, A Right to
Learn?: Improving Educational Outcomes Through Substantive Due Process, 120 HARV. L.
REv. 1323 (2007) (using Youngberg's decision on Due Process to argue in favor of a
positive governmental duty to improve the educational system).
58. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315-16.
59. Id. at319.
60. Id. at 319-20.
61. Id. at 320.
[Vol. 19
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balance the interests of the individual against those of the institution before
coming to the conclusion that there has, or has not, been a substantive due
process violation against the individual.62 Notably, "the courts must show
deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional" as long as
the professional's decisions did not amount to "a substantial departure from
accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards. 63 However, a
professional is afforded qualified immunity for an inability to maintain the
usual professional standard of care as the result of "budgetary
constraints. 64
Succinctly, Youngberg protection refers to the State's "affirmative
obligation to confine the individual under 'conditions of reasonable care
and safety' that are 'reasonably nonrestrictive' and to provide the individual
with 'such training as may be required by these interests."'
6s
2. Narrowly Defining Application in DeShaney
Following Youngberg, the Supreme Court further delineated in its
DeShaney decision when special Fourteenth Amendment protections
arise.66 In DeShaney, the Court determined that "when the State takes a
person into his custody and holds him there against his will, the
Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some
responsibility for his safety and general well-being., 67 There are two
important aspects to this statement. For one, the word "some" reemphasizes
the point made in Youngberg that even though the State has a duty, "the
State 'has considerable discretion in determining the nature and scope of its
responsibilities.', 68 Additionally, the State's affirmative duty only arises if
the State has the person in "custody and holds him there against his will.
69
In other words, the State does not have an affirmative duty to protect an
individual unless the individual fits into a narrow category of people unable
to leave the State's control.7 °
In conjunction, the Youngberg and DeShaney decisions demonstrate the
Court's hesitation to impose an affirmative duty upon the State to protect
the safety of individuals unless the State designates itself as the individual's
sole protector. In the wake of these two decisions, the federal circuit courts
62. Id.
63. Id. at 322-23.
64. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323.
65. Torisky v. Schweiker, 446 F.3d 438, 443 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982)).
66. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200.
67. Id. (citing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317).
68. Id. at 200 n.7 (quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317).
69. Id. at 196, 199-200.
70. Id.
9
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remain split over whether or not the State owes special duties of safety and
protection to the voluntarily committed who reside in state mental health
institutions.
III. ANALYSIS
The federal circuit courts have reached disparate conclusions when
applying the Youngberg and DeShaney decisions to cases involving a
voluntarily admitted mental health patient harmed while institutionalized at
a state facility. Objectively, Youngberg instructs that the State owes
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process protection to those
individuals involuntarily committed in state mental institutions. Similarly,
DeShaney highlights the need for more than a mere "special" relationship
with the State in order to trigger extraordinary Fourteenth Amendment
protections for an individual. In an admittedly broad simplification, the
subsequent federal circuit court decisions fall into one of two categories:
strict adherence and relaxed adherence. Generally, the loosening of
adherence developed over time as society again became more sympathetic
towards people with mental illness.
A. Strict Adherence: No Fourteenth Amendment Protection for the
Voluntarily Committed in Public Institutions
The federal circuit courts that strictly adhere to Youngberg and DeShaney
stringently limit the extension of constitutional protections except in rare
instances of near complete state control over the individual's life. The First
Circuit clearly follows this approach in Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling
Center, Inc.71 Essentially, the Monahan court refused to extend Fourteenth
Amendment protections to a voluntarily committed patient in a state
institution because to do so would lead to a slippery slope of finding a
violation of constitutional rights for every tort attributable to a state actor.
72
For more than a decade, Monahan received episodic hospitalization for
mental illness.73 The problem arose when Monahan required transportation
between his group home and the state mental health center where he
received outpatient treatment.74 Presumably because Monahan had a history
of jumping out of vehicles, the campus police for the state treatment facility
were called upon to transport Monahan between the two locations.75 One
71. See generally Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., 961 F.2d 987 (1st Cir. 1992).
72. Id. at 993-94.
73. Id. at 988.
74. Id.
75. Id. (showing the need for the mental health center's campus police to drive Monahan
because he had "twice jumped out of the vehicle" when a worker at the group home
attempted to drive him).
[Vol. 19
10
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 19 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 7
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol19/iss2/7
2010] A Call for Minds: Unknown Extent of Societal Influence 435
day, Monahan expressed a desire to end his life, so he was transported to
the treatment center, where he was prescribed the incorrect dose of his
medication and "refused admission., 76 Subsequently, Monahan's agitation
failed to subside and he was forced to return to the group home.77 During
the ride back to the group home, Monahan jumped out of the vehicle and
the driver left him wandering about a highway exit ramp.78 By the time
anyone came back for Monahan, he had been "struck by a car and severely
injured. ' 79
The court refused to find that the State owed Monahan any duty of
protection because the State did not hold Monahan in custody against his
will. 80 Instead of state-imposed confinement, "it was Monahan's own
mental condition alone that impinged upon his freedom to leave, it was not
the state that deprived him of that freedom." 81 In other words, the State
could not unduly restrain a person by failing to restrain him. 82 As opposed
to a violation of constitutional rights, Monahan's injury may have been
caused by the negligence of his transporter to restrain him properly despite
awareness of his "propensity to jump out of automobiles. 83 Therefore,
"Monahan's remedies, like those of most others in similar situations, lie in
the arena of tort, not constitutional law.",84 In essence, the Monahan court
wished to uphold the reasoning of DeShaney in order to avoid the slippery
slope of "convert[ing] most torts by state actors into constitutional
violations.',
85
Admittedly, a line should be drawn to prevent all torts by state actors
from becoming constitutional violations, but the court fails to provide a
persuasive reason for drawing the line where it does. Monahan claims to
delimit constitutional boundaries according to DeShaney, but the DeShaney
opinion specifically noted that "institutionalization [would] give rise to an
affirmative duty."86 Monahan's attorney argued as much and failed because
the court read "institutionalization" narrowly to mean that the State
involuntarily "removed" or "placed" the individual into a state facility
rather than admitted the individual to a state facility.87 The court may have
76. Id. at 989.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 990.
81. Id. at 992.
82. Id
83. Id. at 992-93.
84. Id. at 991.
85. Id at 993.
86. Id at 992 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 201 n.9 (1989)).
87. Id.
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preferred this strict reading because the DeShaney court explicitly denied
finding that the State owed a child any extraordinary constitutional
protections despite the particularly disheartening circumstances. 88
However, it could be that the court, perhaps entirely unwittingly, ruled
against Monahan due to its underlying beliefs about the mentally ill. At first
glance, the Monahan court seems to say that the mentally ill are ordinary
people; like anybody else, they have the capacity to communicate their
needs and the freedom to make their own decisions. Alternatively, the court
ruled against Monahan because it fell for the myth that the mentally ill are
merely too lazy to control their base instincts. 89 Relying on this heuristic,
the court would feel entirely justified in denying Monahan's claim because
a lazy person deserves little sympathy, and, by extension, no special legal
safeguards. 90 Of course, this is not to say that judges are easily duped or
inconsiderate. To the contrary, judges are highly educated people with
active minds and a strong desire to foster justice in society. Even so, judges
are members of society and cannot resist the endless barrage of popular
sentiment, including messages that relate negative misconceptions of the
mentally ill.
Although cited91 and followed92 in many subsequent cases, the Monahan
ruling has also been distinguished.93 For example, in Davis v. Rennie, the
court distinguishes Monahan because the opinion "made no evaluation of
the patients' competency at the time of... admissions, and gave no
consideration to the potential effect of incompetency on a determination of
88. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192-93. Despite repeated hospitalizations for suspicious
injuries, the county Department for Social Services continued to allow four year-old Joshua
to live with his father until the father beat Joshua so severely in the head "that he is expected
to spend the rest of his life in an institution for the profoundly retarded." Id.
89. See PERLIN, supra note 2, at 43-47 (discussing sanist myths regarding the mentally
ill).
90. See id. at 44-46 (2000) (discussing myth that persons with mental illnesses are
incompetent and lazy). See also, Mental Health America, Factsheet: Stigma: Building
Awareness and Understanding, http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/go/action/stigma-watch
(last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (setting out some of the same myths as well as others).
91. See, e.g., Torisky, 446 F.3d at 446-47 (citing to Monahan for proposition that valid
consent to enter a facility means there is no deprivation of liberty); Wilson v. Formigoni, 832
F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (N.D. Ill. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 42 F.3d 1060 (7th Cir. 1994)
(citing Monahan for proposition that "involuntarily committed patients have due process
rights to reasonable care and safety while voluntarily committed patients generally do not").
92. See, e.g., Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1299 (5th Cir. 1995) (drawing same
conclusion without reference to Monahan); Estate of Emmons v. Peet, 950 F. Supp. 15, 19
(D. Me. 1996) (following Monahan); Ridlen v. Four County Counseling Ctr., 809 F. Supp
1343, 1356-57 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (following Monahan in case of suicide after release from
institution).
93. See Estate of Cassara by Cassara v. Illinois, 853 F. Supp. 273, 279-80 (N.D. Ill.
1994) (distinguishing Monahan on the basis that plaintiff in Cassara "is not merely alleging
that defendants created a dangerous condition.").
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voluntariness."
94
B. Relaxed Adherence: Blurring the Distinction Between
Involuntary and Voluntary Commitment
As DeShaney became more distant in time and ideological relevance, the
federal circuits found ways to extend Youngberg protections to voluntarily
committed mental health patients. The Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits
express a societal desire to hold state mental health facilities more
accountable for the harm imposed upon patients regardless of the supposed
involuntary/voluntary distinction.
Through Torisky v. Schweiker, the Third Circuit allows the extension of
Fourteenth Amendment protections to any committed mental health
patient-regardless of initial admission conditions-whose harm resulted
from the insufficient protections provided by a state actor in a situation that
resembled involuntary commitment.95 Specifically, the Torisky court
addressed "the issue of whether a state's affirmative duty under the Due
Process Clause to care for and protect a mental health patient in state
custody depends upon the individual's custody being involuntary. 96 First
of all, the Torisky court acknowledged that even though "[some] residents
of state institutions.. .do not qualify.. .for protection under Youngberg
[because of their circumstances,] [they] nevertheless possess other
substantive due process rights to be free of certain state interference in their
lives." 97 While the Torisky court maintained that Youngberg rights are
reserved for people involuntarily committed, the court stipulated that certain
circumstances may change the status of an individual from voluntary to
involuntary, and in those situations, the State owes the individual the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process protections discussed in Youngberg.98
In Torisky, the court found that it would be possible for a voluntarily
committed individual to prove that her transfer between facilities-while in
state custody-created a situation implicating Youngberg protections. 99
94. Davis v. Rennie, 997 F. Supp. 137, 140 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1998).
95. Torisky, 446 F.3d at 441,
96. Id.
97. Id. at 443 (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)) ("Clearly, voluntarily
committed persons have substantive due process rights to be free from unjustified or
unauthorized government interference with their fundamental rights, such as the right to
court access, to vote, and to marry.").
98. Torisky, 446 F.3d at 446-47 (citing Kennedy v. Schafer, 71 F. 3d 292, 295 (8th Cir.
1995) (reversing defendant's summary judgment because the voluntarily admitted patient
may have taken on the status of involuntary commitment at the time of her suicide); United
States v. Pennsylvania, 832 F. Supp. 122, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("[A] voluntary commitment
may, over time, take on the character of an involuntary one")).
99. Torisky, 446 F.3d at 447-48.
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Breaking from its previously held position, the Third Circuit addressed
the blurry distinction between voluntary and involuntary commitment.100
Prior to Torisky, the Third Circuit concluded in Fialkowski v. Greenwich
Home for Children, Inc. that Youngberg protections only arose if the State
affirmatively acted to place the individual into the institution. °1 In fact,
Monahan relied on Fialkowski in its opinion. 10 2 Without openly
distinguishing Fialkowski or Monahan, the Third Circuit recognized in
Torisky that commitment status could change from voluntary to involuntary
when the State deprives the individual of the ability to leave, as through
"physical or chemical restraints.,
10 3
The language of the Torisky opinion demonstrates the court's interest in
becoming more sensitive to the struggles facing the mentally ill. In fact, the
court cites to academics including Michael Perlin, a renowned proponent of
expansive rights for the mentally ill. 10 4 Perhaps events in the years between
Monahan and Torisky involved a shift in popular perception that made the
judges more compassionate towards persons with mental illnesses.
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit more flexibly defined Youngberg's
requirement of "involuntary commitment" and distinguished DeShaney by
finding that confinement to a state mental institution creates a de facto
special relationship with the State.105 This notion of a special relationship
harkens back to pre-DeShaney reasoning and posits that attempts to draw
any meaningful line between involuntary and voluntary commitment would
lead to too much variation in decisions.
In the recent case of Lanman v. Hinson, the Sixth Circuit found that
when a patient signs a consent waiver he or she does not sign away the right
to be safe from harm. 10 6 Instead of narrowly reading the Supreme Court
decisions, the Lanman court referred to the pre-DeShaney case of Society
for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo for a more realistic
approach given the circumstances of commitment generally. 10 7 In Society
for Good Will, the Second Circuit refused the technical distinction between
voluntary and involuntary because (1) "there is a due process right to
freedom from governmentally imposed undue bodily restraint for anyone at
100. Id. at 446-47.
101. Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children, Inc., 921 F.2d 459, 466 (3d Cir.
1990).
102. Monahan, 961 F.2d at 991.
103. Torisky, 446 F.3d at 446.
104. Id. at 446-47.
105. See Lojuk v. Quandt, 706 F.2d 1456, 1466 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Doe v. Public
Health Trust, 696 F.2d 901, 905 (11th Cir. 1983) (reasoning that "though technically a
'voluntary patient, [the plaintiff] was a 'de facto involuntary patient' because of his
incompetence.")).
106. Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 683 (6th Cir. 2008).
107. Id. at 688- 89.
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any time' 108 and (2) "anyone in a state institution has a right to safe
conditions." 10 9 Consequently, the Lanman court reasoned for the collapse of
voluntary commitment status into involuntary commitment status because
the "voluntary/involuntary distinction, while perhaps relevant to whether
the State has the duty to protect patients from third-party harm, is irrelevant
to the right of individuals, whatever their status, to be free from physical
abuse at the hands of the State."
' 110
Unlike the approach of strict adherence that relies on semantics, relaxed
adherence takes into account the purpose of mental health institutions, the
complexity of mental illness and civil commitment, and the undercurrent of
discrimination against the mentally ill in society.
IV. RESOLUTION
Notably, the Youngberg and DeShaney decisions came down in the early
1980s, during the proclaimed era of reduced empathy."' DeShaney
especially characterized the era. Shortly thereafter, the federal circuit courts
followed suit with decisions like Monahan. Slowly, the adherence to
Youngberg and DeShaney went from strict to more sympathetic towards the
injured victim with a mental health disorder, as demonstrated by Torisky
and, most recently, Lanman. At least, this is what appears to have
transpired.
As with mental illness generally, the courts increasingly appreciate that
there is a continuum of voluntariness despite the inflexibility of language,
namely through the terms "involuntary commitment" and "voluntary
commitment." Casting aside a strict reading of Youngberg and DeShaney,
most circuit courts have moderately established that only people
involuntarily committed to state mental institutions have claims against
state actors who violate their Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights.
However, voluntarily committed individuals may transform status into
involuntarily committed at any time, especially when being mistreated.
108. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1245-46 (2d
Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 902 F.2d 1085 (2d Dist. 1985) (citing Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Parham
v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 601 (1979)).
109. Society for Good Will, 737 F.2d at 1246 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307, 315-16 (1982)).
110. Lanman, 529 F.3d at 688-89 (citing Society for Good Will, 737 F. 2d at 1245-46).
The Lanman court attempted to avoid analysis of contradictory precedent by simply finding
that Lanman's "status as voluntary or involuntary is irrelevant as to his constitutional right to
be free from the State depriving him of liberty without due process." Lanman, 529 F.3d. at
682 n.1.
111. Thomas L. Hafemeister & John Petrila, Treating the Mentally Disordered
Offender: Society's Uncertain, Conflicted, and Changing Views, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 729,
742-43 (1994).
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Undeniably, every patient in a mental institution, no matter if committed
voluntarily or involuntarily, lacks the ability to leave whenever he or she
pleases. No patient is allowed to leave of his or her own free will without
having first received the okay by a medical professional. Therefore, both
involuntarily and voluntarily committed individuals may be entitled to
Fourteenth Amendment protections when in the custody of a state actor.
The court's line for determining dependency upon the State will probably
rise and fall with changes in the popular perception of the mentally ill. After
poignant stories of mental patients harming themselves and others, popular
sentiment-which is often laden with stigma-has pushed lawmakers,
enforcers, and interpreters to increase government involvement in the lives
of the mentally ill.
Remarkably, the discussion of court decisions regarding mental illness
lacks reference to methodical research, which is possible with tools such as
economic theory. While economics may be incapable of explaining how
mentally ill individuals will act, it may be able to make sense of how their
families and legal players may act in response. Empirical data about the
connection between media scares over mental illness and changes in law
would likely produce interesting results.
V. CONCLUSION
The legal system struggles to effectively deal with mental illness,
especially in the non-criminal setting. Commitment to a mental institution
inherently involves coercion upon an individual who already battles against
his or her own mind. Popular sentiment, often exacerbated by media
coverage, unquestionably sways the decisions of legal players. In ways not
fully comprehended, this nation's various legal outcomes regarding mental
illness over the past century reflect changes in societal perceptions and
misconceptions of mental illness. However, the dynamics of the
relationship remain uncertain without empirical research to answer the
question.
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